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Although	  much	  scholarly	  attention	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  examining	  the	  punctuated	  dynamics	  of	   ideational	  
change,	  other	  dynamics	  exist.	   Ideational	  change	  may	  well	  occur	  incrementally	  in	  ordinary	  times	  or,	  as	  this	  
study	  shows,	  can	  also	  materialize	  after	  a	  major	  shock,	  such	  as	  a	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  By	  examining	  
the	   IMF’s	   new	   approach	   to	   capital	   controls	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   paper	  
demonstrates	  that	  the	  non-­‐punctuated	  nature	  of	  ideational	  change	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  light	  of	  the	  enabling	  
(and	   not	   solely	   constraining)	   features	   of	   the	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   actors	   operate.	   Rather	   than	  
preventing	   change	   until	   an	   explosion	   of	   radical	   change	   occurs,	   institutional	   frictions	   may	   also	   allow	   for	  
successive	   adjustments	   over	   time.	   They	   may	   in	   fact	   allow	   for	   a	   gradual	   release	   of	   pressure,	   thereby	  
preventing	  the	  impending	  explosion.	  	  	  	  
	  












The	  use	  of	  controls	   in	  cross-­‐border	  capital	   transactions	   is	  probably	  one	  of	   the	  most	  controversial	  
issues	   in	   scholarly	   and	   policy-­‐making	   circles.	   After	   having	   been	   officially	   enshrined	   in	   the	   international	  
financial	   architecture	   designed	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	   capital	   controls	   have	   progressively	  
become	   ‘heterodoxy’,	   so	   much	   so	   that	   capital	   account	   liberalization	   had	   been	   a	   hallmark	   of	   global	  
economic	  governance	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.i	  The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF	  or	  Fund)	  has	  been	  
at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   merits	   of	   capital	   account	   liberalisation	   and	   controls,	   particularly	  
because	  of	  its	  distinctive	  organizational	  features.	  For	  one	  thing,	  the	  Fund	  has	  regularly	  produced	  research	  
and	  empirical	   evidence	   that	  has	   informed	   the	   global	   debate	  on	   this	   issue.	  Additionally,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
Fund	  may	  in	  principle	  use	  its	  conditionality	  in	  order	  to	  push	  its	  quasi-­‐universal	  membership	  to	  liberalize	  (or	  
reduce	   the	   stigma	  associated	  with	   the	  use	  of	   controls)	  made	   the	  Fund	  a	  powerful	   voice	   that	   can	   tilt	   the	  
debate	  in	  favour	  or	  against	  the	  use	  of	  controls.	  The	  IMF’s	  position	  on	  capital	  controls	  is	  thus	  not	  only	  very	  
important	   per	   se	   but	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   crucial	   litmus	   tests	   for	   assessing	   ideational	   changes	   in	   global	  
financial	  governance	  at	  large.	  	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  examine	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Fund’s	   ideas	  on	  capital	   controls	  
since	  2007	  –	  a	  process	   that	   is	  here	  defined	  as	   ideational	  dynamics.	   Indeed,	   since	   the	  burst	  of	   the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	   in	  2007,	  the	  Fund	  has	  significantly	  revised	   its	  previous	  policy	  stance	  on	  this	   issue.	  While	   in	  
the	   1990s	   the	   predominant	   view	   was	   that	   capital	   controls	   should	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   policy	   toolkit	   that	  
countries	  can	  use	  to	  manage	  capital	   inflows	   (Chwieroth	  2010a;	  Grabel	  2010;	  Moschella	  2010a),	   the	  same	  
controls	   are	   now	   regarded	   as	   useful	   instruments	   to	   manage	   the	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   stability	  
challenges	  resulting	  from	  large	  capital	  inflows.	  The	  introduction	  of	  outflows	  controls	  in	  Iceland	  and	  Cyprus	  
under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  Fund	  further	  attests	  to	  the	  significant	  ideational	  transformations	  that	  have	  unfolded	  
since	  the	  burst	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  2007-­‐08.	  The	  Fund’s	  changed	  approach	  to	  controls	  therefore	  speaks	  directly	  
to	   the	   research	   agenda	   that	   attempts	   to	   map	   and	   evaluate	   the	   implications	   of	   financial	   crises	   from	   a	  
political	  economy	  of	  ideas	  perspective	  (c.f.	  Baker	  and	  Underhill	  2012).	  
Examining	  the	   ideational	  transformation	  that	  has	  recently	  taken	  place	  within	  the	  Fund,	  the	  paper	  
argues	   that	   the	   Fund’s	   ideational	   shift	   represents	   a	   case	   of	   incremental	   change	   that	   varies	   from	   the	  
standard	  process	  of	  change	  identified	  in	  most	  ideational	  studies	  in	  political	  economy.	  This	  standard	  process	  
can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   punctuated	   process,	   that	   is,	   a	   process	   in	   which	   periods	   of	   ideational	   stability	   are	  
followed	  by	  periods	  of	   ideational	  change	  that,	   in	  turn,	  fall	  back	  on	  stability.	   In	  contrast,	   in	  the	  case	  under	  
investigation,	   ideational	  change	  was	  slower	  and	  more	  incremental	  than	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  claims	  it	  to	  
be	  even	  after	  a	  major	  shock.	  
So	   what	   factors	   account	   for	   such	   a	   dynamic?	   In	   the	   ‘punctuated’	   explanation,	   the	   dynamic	   of	  
ideational	   change	   is	   largely	   explained	   in	   light	   of	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   frictions	   (or	   inertia)	   that	  
characterize	  ‘ordinary’	  times.	  Specifically,	  once	  an	  idea	  becomes	  embedded	  in	  the	  design	  of	  an	  institution,	  
the	   new	   equilibrium	   becomes	   path-­‐dependent,	   thus	   preventing	   change	   (Cox	   2004)	   until	   the	  moment	   in	  
which	   radical	   uncertainty	   opens	   up	   the	  way	   for	   new	   ideas	   to	   emerge	   once	   again	   (e.g.	   Baker	   2012;	   Best	  
2003;	  Blyth	  2002;	  Chwieroth	  2010b;	  Hay	  1996;	  Widmaier,	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  
Although	  this	  explanation	  applies	  to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  dynamics	  of	  change	  in	  economic	  
policy	   in	   the	   past	   decades	   (c.f.	   Hall	   1993),	   the	   frictions	   have	  been	   somehow	  exaggerated	   and	  have	   thus	  
obscured	   the	  presence	  of	  other	   change	  dynamics.	   The	  paper	   thus	   argues	   that	   ideational	   change	  may	  be	  
slower	  and	  more	  incremental	  than	  is	  often	  acknowledged	  because	  the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  in	  which	  actors	  
operate	   is	   not	   only	   constraining	   but	   also	   enabling	   (for	   a	   different	   view	   see	  Underhill	   in	   this	   issue).	   As	   a	  
result,	  rather	  than	  preventing	  change	  until	  an	  explosion	  of	  radical	  change	  occurs,	  institutional	  frictions	  may	  
also	  allow	  for	  successive	  adjustments	  over	  time.	  They	  may	  in	  fact	  allow	  for	  a	  gradual	  release	  of	  pressure,	  
thereby	  preventing	  the	  impending	  explosion.	  	  	  	  
Advancing	   this	   argument,	   the	   paper	   builds	   on	   important	   recent	   attempts	   at	   bridge-­‐building	  
between	   International	   Relations	   and	   Comparative	   Politics	   (Fioretos	   2011)	   that	   have	   drawn	   attention	   to	  
agent-­‐centred	   models	   of	   institutional	   change	   by	   emphasizing	   the	   empowering	   nature	   of	   institutions	  
alongside	   their	   constraining	   features	   (Bell	   2011a).	   The	   permissive	   environment	   in	   which	   actors	   operate	  
creates	  the	  conditions	  for	  ideational	  change	  to	  take	  place	  without	  disrupting	  existing	  institutional	  settings:	  
change	  may	  well	  take	  place	  within	  the	  space	  provided	  by	  those	  settings	  and	  thus	  unfold	  in	  an	  incremental	  
fashion.	  
In	   the	   case	   under	   investigation,	   the	   flexibility	   provided	   by	   the	   Fund’s	   institutional	   mandate,	   as	  
enshrined	   in	   its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	   favoured	   the	   incremental	   embrace	  of	   capital	   controls.ii	   As	  will	   be	  
illustrated	  at	  greater	  length	  below,	  IMF	  staff	  members	  modified	  the	  Fund’s	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  within	  the	  
parameters	   set	   by	   its	   mandate.	   As	   a	   result,	   rather	   than	   disrupting	   the	   existing	   equilibrium,	   ideational	  
change	  took	  place	  within	  it.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  change	  was	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  specificities	  of	  
the	   institutional	   mandate,	   thereby	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   type	   of	   ideational	   change	   that	   presents	   broad	  
continuities	   with	   past	   policy	   ideas.	   This	   is	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	   slow	   incorporation	   of	   the	   lessons	  
drawn	  from	  the	  serial	  crises	  in	  emerging	  market	  countries	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  
By	  drawing	  attention	  to	  an	  understudied	  dynamic	  of	  ideational	  change,	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  pretend	  
to	  supplant	  punctuated	  models	  of	  ideational	  change,	  but	  rather	  to	  supplement	  them.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  a	  
purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  advance	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  ideational	  change	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  
the	  presence	  of	  factors	  	  -­‐	  such	  as	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  institutional	  environment	  in	  which	  actors	  operate	  –	  
that	  may	  bring	  about	  change	  dynamics	  that	  are	  different	  from	  the	  standard	  punctuated	  model.	  
Before	  proceeding,	  three	  clarifications	  are	  in	  order	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research.	  Firstly,	  
the	  paper	   is	   solely	   concerned	  with	   investigating	   the	   causes	  of	   ideational	   change.	   That	   is,	   the	   focus	   is	   on	  
‘norm	   emergence’	   (Finnemore	   and	   Sikkink	   1998)	   or	   the	   development	   of	   intersubjective	   understandings	  
(Widmaier,	  et	  al.	  2007).	   In	  contrast,	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	   ideational	  change	  is	   instantiated	  into	  
institutional	   change	   and	   those	   that	   account	   for	   ideational	   diffusion	   do	   not	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  
research	  (on	  these	  mechanisms	  see	  Babb	  2012).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  causal	  factors	  that	  are	  identified	  here	  
to	   explain	   the	   incremental	   pattern	   of	   ideational	   change	   do	   not	   necessarily	   also	   explain	   why	   ideas	   are	  
instantiated	  into	  policy	  recommendations	  and	  practices	  and	  diffused	  internationally.	  	  
Secondly,	   the	   adjective	   ‘incremental’	   is	   used	   here	   to	   distinguish	   a	   type	   of	   ideational	   change	   that	   is	  
neither	  punctuated	  nor	  paradigmatic.	  In	  short,	  it	  indicates	  a	  process	  of	  change	  that	  is	  continuous	  in	  time:	  it	  
does	  not	  represent	  a	  rupture,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  punctuated	  models.	  It	  also	  indicates	  change	  that	  preserves	  
some	   broad	   continuities	   with	   past	   policy	   ideas	   without	   challenging	   the	   overall	   terms	   of	   a	   given	   policy	  
paradigm	  (Hall	  1993,	  279).	  
Finally,	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  focuses	  solely	  on	  the	  intellectual	  change	  pertaining	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  inflow	  
capital	  controls,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  restrictive	  measures	  that	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  residency	  of	  the	  
parties	   to	   a	   capital	   transaction.	   That	   is,	   the	   analysis,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   first-­‐hand	   interviews,	   archival	  
material	   and	   secondary	   sources,	   traces	   the	  evolution	  of	  a	   specific	   aspect	   related	   to	   capital	   liberalization:	  
the	   use	   of	   controls	   as	   a	   policy	   tool	   to	   prevent	   or	   manage	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   challenges	  
associated	  with	  large	  capital	  inflows.	  	  
The	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  The	  next	  section	  reviews	  the	  orthodox	  view	  of	  ideational	  change	  in	  
studies	   in	  political	   economy.	   In	  particular,	   it	   shows	   that	  much	  of	   the	   literature	  on	   ideational	   change	  has	  
focused	  on	  the	  type	  of	  change	  that	  takes	  place	  under	  exceptional	  circumstances	  and	  follows	  a	  punctuated	  
dynamic.	   Section	   2	   traces	   the	   incremental	   ideational	   change	   that	   has	   taken	   place	  within	   the	   IMF	   in	   the	  
aftermath	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis.	  This	   is	   then	  compared	  with	   the	   IMF’s	  approach	  during	   the	  1990s.	  
Section	  3	  explains	  this	  specific	  pattern	  of	  ideational	  change	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  
between	   IMF	   staff	  members	  and	   the	  evolving	   institutional	   and	   structural	   settings	   in	  which	   they	  operate.	  
The	   last	   section	   concludes	  by	   reflecting	  on	   the	   empirical	   findings	   and	   their	   implications	   for	   the	   research	  
agenda	  on	  ideational	  change.	  	  
	  
1. Agents,	  institutions	  and	  ideational	  change	  
	  
At	  the	  risk	  of	  simplifying	  what	  is	  a	  variegated	  and	  sophisticated	  literature,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  say	  that,	  in	  recent	  
years,	   ideational	   studies	   in	   comparative	   and	   international	   political	   economy	  have	   advanced	   to	   the	   point	  
where	   the	   basic	   contours	   and	   factors	   driving	   ideational	   change	   are	   now	   reasonably	   well-­‐identified	   and	  
understood.	  Specifically,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  points	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  pattern	  that	  can	  
be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  an	  exogenous	  shock,	  such	  as	  a	  financial	  or	  economic	  crisis,	  opens	  up	  a	  window	  
of	  opportunity	   that	  allows	  elite	  or	  non-­‐elite	  actors	   to	  recast	   the	  terms	  of	  previous	  debate	  by	   introducing	  
new	  ideas	  that,	  in	  turn,	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  bringing	  about	  policy	  change	  (Widmaier,	  et	  al.	  2007;	  see	  
also	  Braun	  in	  this	  issue).	  	  
Of	  course,	  there	  are	  still	  several	  outstanding	  issues	  to	  be	  resolved,	  such	  as	  the	  exact	  meaning	  of	  the	  
term	   idea.	   The	  question	  of	  how	  new	   ideas	   come	   to	  be	   favoured	  once	  old	   ideas	  have	  been	  discredited	   is	  
itself	  controversial	   (Mehta	  2011,	  31).	  Nevertheless,	  once	  these	  conceptual	   issues	  are	  cleared	  away,	   it	  can	  
be	  seen	  that	  many	  constructivist	  scholars	  now	  share	  an	  agreement	  on	  a	  general	  basic	  pattern	  of	  ideational	  
change	  that	  revolves	  around	  two	  characteristics.	  	  
To	   start	   with,	   the	   process	   of	   change	   results	   from	   the	   deliberate	   actions	   of	   individual	   agents	   or	  
groups	   of	   agents.	   In	   particular,	   agents	   creatively	   interpret	   the	  material	   and	   institutional	   reality	   in	  which	  
they	  operate.iii	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  develop	  new	  ideas	  and	  try	  to	  persuade	  other	  actors	  to	  accept	  them.	  Bèland	  
and	  Cox	  (2011,	  12)	  summarize	  the	  tenets	  of	  this	  consensual	  view	  in	  ideational	  research;	  ‘there	  is	  material	  
reality,	  but	  it	  lends	  itself	  to	  many	  interpretations	  than	  open	  endless	  options	  for	  human	  agency’.	  As	  a	  result,	  
most	  attention	  to	  date	  has	  shed	  light	  upon	  the	  actors	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  use	  to	  gain	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  
ideational	  battles	  (e.g.	  Abdelal	  2007;	  Blyth	  2002;	  Chwieroth	  2008;	  Hay	  1996;	  Jabko	  2006;	  McNamara	  1998;	  
Park	  and	  Vetterlein	  2010;	  Parsons	  2002).	  	  
Alongside	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  creativity	  of	  human	  agency,	  the	  standard	  view	  on	  ideational	  change	  
also	   posits	   the	   importance	  of	   exogenous	   shocks.	   In	   particular,	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   new	   ideas	   are	  more	  
likely	  to	  emerge	  following	  turning	  points	  or	  critical	  junctures,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  magnify	  conditions	  
of	  uncertainty	  –	  i.e.	  situations	  when	  the	  ability	  of	  agents	  to	  form	  any	  meaningful	  estimate	  of	  future	  trends	  
becomes	   severely	   constrained	   (Best	   2005;	   Blyth	   2002).	   In	   the	   face	   of	   uncertainty,	   agents	   rely	   on	  
intersubjective	  understandings	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  material	  reality	  in	  which	  they	  live.	  Ideas	  assume	  center	  
stage	  in	  this	  process.	  Indeed,	  they	  shape	  how	  people	  understand	  political	  problems,	  define	  their	  goals	  and	  
strategies	   and	   settle	   around	   specific	   policy	   solutions	   (Blyth	   2002).	   Uncertainty	   is	   thus	   key	   to	   the	  
development	  and	  diffusion	  of	  new	  ideas	  (also	  Broome	  2010).	  ‘In	  such	  a	  context	  agents	  become	  more	  open	  
to…the	  influence	  of	  ideas’	  (Blyth	  2007,	  775).	  
Given	  these	  characteristics,	  the	  process	  of	  ideational	  change	  is	  likely	  to	  follow	  a	  punctuated	  model.	  
Constructivists	  suggest	  that	  once	  ideas	  are	  instantiated	  into	  institutions,	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  will	  be	  created.	  
This	   in	   turn	  will	   exhibit	  path-­‐dependent	   characteristics	   that	   result	   from	  both	   the	  workings	  of	   institutions	  
and	  the	  ideas	  upon	  which	  those	  institutions	  were	  created.	  In	  short,	  both	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  inertia	  
creates	   stability	   (Hay	   2011,	   68-­‐9).	   When	   these	   constraining	   forces	   are	   released,	   usually	   because	   of	   an	  
exogenous	   shock,	   new	   ideas	   are	  brought	   front	   and	   centre	   into	   the	  policy	   debate.	   The	  new	   ideas	  usually	  
provide	  a	   significantly	  different	   solution	   to	  policy	  problems	   than	   the	  one	   supported	  by	  prior	   ideas.	   Since	  
exogenous	  shocks	  usually	  demonstrate	  the	  link	  between	  ideas	  and	  institutions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  policy	  
failure,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  common	  reaction	  is	  to	  propose	  radically	  different	  ideas.	  In	  short,	  ideas	  have	  
to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  status	  quo.	  As	  a	  result,	  political	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  proactive	  effort	  ‘to	  
reexamine	  their	  surroundings,	  reconsider	  their	  positions,	  and	  develop	  fresh	  new	  approaches’	  (Béland	  and	  
Cox	  2011,	  11).	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  ‘the	  most	  popular	  theories	  of	  ideational	  change	  [are]	  those	  that	  focus	  on	  paradigm	  
shifts’	   (Schmidt	   2011,	   55),	   that	   is,	   studies	   that	   emphasize	   ‘the	  broad	   and	  pervasive	  nature’	   of	   ideational	  
change,	  such	  as	  the	  well-­‐known	  shift	  from	  Keynesianism	  to	  Monetarism	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  
(Hall	  1993)	  or	  that	   from	  isolationism	  to	  crusading	   liberalism	  following	  the	  attacks	   in	  the	  United	  States	  on	  
September	   11,	   2011	   (Widmaier	   2007,	   792).	   Indeed,	   while	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   stability	   that	  
characterizes	  the	  pre-­‐shock	  period	  discourages	  change,	  it	  will	  eventually	  cause	  even	  larger	  bursts	  of	  change	  
than	  is	  the	  case	  in	  settings	  with	  less	  stability	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993;	  Jones	  and	  Baumgartner	  2005).	  
That	   is	   to	   say,	   ‘systems	   characterized	   by	   friction	   remain	   stable	   until	   the	   signals	   from	   outside	   exceed	   a	  
threshold,	   and	   then	   they	   lurch	   forward’	   (Jones,	   et	   al.	   2009,	   867).	   The	   transformation	   of	   intersubjective	  
understandings	  that	  follows	  major	  wars	  and	  crises	  fits	  with	  this	  description	  in	  that	   it	   leads	  elite	  and	  mass	  
public	  agents	  to	  reassess	  ‘‘who	  they	  are’’	  and	  ‘‘what	  they	  want’’	  (Widmaier,	  et	  al.	  2007).	  
According	   to	   the	   logic	  examined	  thus	   far,	  existing	   ideas	  and	   institutions	  are	  considered	  as	  almost	  
exclusively	   constraining.	   As	   such,	   they	   are	   seen	   as	   preventing	   change	   to	   the	   point	   where	   the	   pressure	  
becomes	  irresistible	  and	  forces	  a	  sudden	  burst	  of	  change.	  The	  conceptualization	  of	  bureaucratic	  culture	  in	  
ideational	  studies	  on	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  international	  organizations	  (IOs)	  well	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  	  
Bureaucratic	  culture	  is	  indeed	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  factors	  that	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  IOs	  
have	   difficulties	   in	   adapting	   their	   policies	   to	   changed	   economic	   and	   political	   circumstances	   (Barnett	   and	  
Finnemore	  2004;	  Momani	  2007).	  As	  Liam	  Clegg	  (2011)	  notes,	  ‘the	  dominant	  “bureaucratic	  culture”	  serves	  
to	  fix	  the	  “points	  of	  reference”	  around	  which	  discussions	  of	  policy	  reform	  take	  place.’	  Bureaucratic	  inertia,	  
usually	   associated	   with	   deference	   towards	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   shareholders,	   usually	  
prevents	  change	  from	  occurring	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  (Babb	  2012).	  This	  constraint	  leads	  
to	   a	   dynamic	  of	   change	   that	   follows	   the	  punctuated	  model:	   stasis	   prevails	   until	   some	  event	  –	  be	   it	   new	  
recruitment	  (Chwieroth	  2008)	  or	  a	  new	  leadership	  (Weaver	  2008	  108)	  –	  ruptures	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  pushes	  
new	  and	  alternative	  ideas	  into	  the	  debate.	  	  
It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  existing	   ideas	  and	  institutions	  as	  obstacles	  to	  
the	   emergence	   of	   new	   ideas	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   IO	   scholarship	   but	   is	   one	   of	   the	   hallmarks	   of	  many	  
ideational	  studies	  where	  one	  or	  more	  factors	  account	  for	  the	  non-­‐emergence	  of	  new	  ideas.	  For	  example,	  
mass	   expectations	   about	   how	   the	   economy	   should	  work	   set	   limits	   on	   the	   economic	   thinking	   of	  UK	   elite	  
policy	  makers	   in	   the	   interwar	   period	   (Seabrooke	   2007).	   Likewise,	   an	   intellectual	   paradigm	   based	   on	   the	  
efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  prevented	  the	  emergence	  of	  alternative	  ideas	  on	  macroprudential	  regulation	  in	  
the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (Baker	  2012).	  	  	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   predominantly	   constraining	   view	   of	   ideational	   and	   institutional	   stability,	   a	   key	  
argument	  of	  this	  paper	   is	  that	   ideas	  and	  institutions	  are	  enabling	  and	  not	  solely	  constraining.	   It	   is	  exactly	  
this	  double	  nature	   that	   can	  help	  account	   for	   incremental	  patterns	  of	   ideational	   change	  even	  after	  major	  
exogenous	  shocks.	  	  
For	  one	  thing,	  existing	  ideas	  may	  provide	  space	  for	  the	  development	  of	  new	  ones.	  This	  may	  occur	  
following	  the	  logic	  suggested	  by	  Martin	  Carstensen	  (2011)	  according	  to	  whom	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  idea	  can	  
only	  be	  understood	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  consideration	  of	  elements	  of	  meaning	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  
idea.	  Some	  elements	  are	  central	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  idea,	  while	  others	  take	  up	  a	  more	  marginal	  position.	  
Over	   time,	   the	   elements	   inhabiting	   a	   peripheral	   position	   in	   the	   idea	   may	   gravitate	   to	   a	   more	   central	  
position,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  therefore	  leading	  to	  ideational	  evolution	  of	  an	  incremental	  type.	  To	  other	  scholars,	  
ideational	   stability	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   condition	   favouring	   change	   –	   and	   not	   hindering	   it	   –	   because	  
existing	   ideas	   provide	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   development	   of	   new	   ones.	   As	   Jacqueline	   Best	   (2004)	   has	  
shown,	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  Keynesian	  ideas	  that	  had	  informed	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement	  cannot	  
be	   characterized	   either	   as	   a	   clear	   continuity	   or	   as	   a	   complete	   breach	  with	   past	   norms.	   Rather,	   it	  was	   a	  
process	  of	   ‘hollowing	  out’	   through	  which	  a	  neoclassical	   synthesis	  developed	  both	  out	  of	  Keynesian	   ideas	  
and	  out	  of	  attempts	  to	  provide	  some	  technical	  fixes	  to	  these	  (cf.	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  2011).	  
Alongside	   the	   permissive	   nature	   of	   existing	   ideas,	   another	   key	   factor	   for	   explaining	   a	   non-­‐
punctuated	   dynamic	   of	   ideational	   change	   is	   the	   permissive	   nature	   of	   the	   institutional	   contexts	   in	  which	  
actors	   operate	   (Bell	   2011a;	   2011b;	   Moschella	   and	   Tsingou	   2013).	   Indeed,	   recent	   advances	   in	   historical	  
institutionalist	   literature	  have	  convincingly	  shown	  that	   institutions	  do	  not	  solely	  prevent	  change.	   Instead,	  
institutions	  also	  allow	  for	  an	  endogenous	  dynamic	  of	  change.	  This	  happens	  because	  even	  the	  most	  formal	  
institutions	  exhibit	  some	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  that	  opens	  up	  the	  way	  to	  new	  interpretations	  (Mahoney	  and	  
Thelen	  2010).	  	  It	  can	  also	  happen	  because	  institutions,	  as	  norms	  of	  social	  behaviour,	  need	  to	  be	  reproduced	  
in	  practice	  through	  agents	  that	  apply	  them	  to	  their	  specific	  –	  and	  changing	  –	  situations	  (Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  
2005).	   In	   short,	   even	   in	   the	  most	   ‘institutionalized’	   settings,	   actors	   retain	   some	   room	   to	  manoeuvre	   to	  
develop	  new	  ideas	  about	  how	  a	  specific	  institution	  should	  work	  in	  changed	  circumstances	  or	  about	  how	  a	  
specific	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  should	  be	  (re)interpreted.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  institutions	  also	  set	  limits	  on	  which	  ideas	  can	  be	  ultimately	  selected	  (also	  Underhill	  in	  
this	  issue).	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  actors	  are	  not	  norm-­‐following	  machines	  and	  can	  creatively	  (re)interpret	  existing	  
institutions	  in	  light	  of	  new	  circumstances,	  these	  (re)interpretations	  are	  not	  completely	  detached	  from	  the	  
institutions	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  change	  (Moschella	  2011).	  For	   instance,	  Vivien	  Schmidt	  (2002)	  has	  forcefully	  
shown	  that	  the	  ideas	  developed	  by	  political	  elites	  in	  Britain,	  France	  and	  Germany	  to	  justify	  the	  changes	  in	  
political	   economic	   policies	   as	   a	   response	   to	   globalization	   and	   Europeanization	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	  
different	  institutional	  contexts.	  	  
In	  short,	  institutions	  have	  a	  double	  nature:	  they	  serve	  both	  as	  structures	  that	  constrain	  thinking	  and	  
acting,	   and	   as	   constructs	   that	   can	   be	   changed	   by	   actors	   (Schmidt	   2008).	   As	   a	   result,	  while	   they	   provide	  
some	   space	   for	   the	   development	   of	   new	   ideas	   due	   to	   their	   need	   for	   continuous	   interpretation	   and	  
application,	   institutions	  set	  a	   limit	   to	   the	   ‘endless	  options	  of	  human	  agency’	   in	   this	  process.	  Under	   these	  
conditions,	   ideational	   change	   is	   likely	   to	   follow	  an	   incremental	   rather	   than	  a	  punctuated	  dynamic.	   If	   the	  
development	   of	   new	   ideas	   is	   not	   contingent	   upon	   the	   disruption	   of	   old	   institutions,	   the	   process	   of	  
ideational	  innovation	  does	  not	  require	  the	  development	  of	  a	  completely	  new	  approach	  to	  institutions	  but	  
may	  take	  place	  through	  marginal	  adjustments.	  
In	   the	   sections	   that	   follow,	   I	   show	   how	   these	   theoretical	   arguments	   can	   be	   linked	   to	   empirical	  
evidence.	   In	   particular,	   I	   illustrate	   how	   the	   ideational	   and	   institutional	   stability	   that	   preceded	   the	   crisis	  
created	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  adjustments	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  thinking	  on	  controls	  following	  the	  crisis.	  	  
	  
2. Capital	  controls’	  incremental	  path	  to	  legitimacy	  
	  
The	  debate	  on	  the	  most	  appropriate	  mix	  of	  policies	  to	  manage	  the	  effects	  of	  global	  financial	  integration	  is	  a	  
long-­‐standing	  and	  controversial	  issue.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  those	  policies	  that	  help	  to	  
mitigate	  the	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  stability	  effects	  of	  large	  capital	  inflows.	  On	  the	  macroeconomic	  
front,	  the	  concern	  is	  that	  capital	  surges	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  that	  will,	  in	  turn,	  
undermine	   the	   competitiveness	  of	   the	   tradable	   sector,	   thereby	   jeopardizing	  exports	   and	  growth.	  On	   the	  
financial	   front,	   capital	   inflows	   constitute	   a	   serious	   challenge	   to	   domestic	   economic	  management	   in	   that	  
they	   may	   fuel	   asset	   and	   credit	   booms.	   	   A	   boom	   in	   foreign-­‐exchange-­‐denominated	   credit	   is	   especially	  
dangerous	  if	  extended	  to	  borrowers	  lacking	  a	  natural	  ‘hedge’	  (e.g.	  to	  households	  rather	  than	  exporters).	  In	  
light	  of	  these	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  risks,	  capital	  inflows	  (especially	  short-­‐term	  liabilities)	  can	  make	  
the	  country	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  financial	  crisis	  if	  not	  appropriately	  managed.	  
	   However,	  what	  constitutes	  appropriate	  economic	  management	  is	  itself	  a	  matter	  of	  intense	  debate,,	  
as	   the	   history	   of	   IMF	   advice	   to	   emerging	   market	   countries	   over	   the	   last	   twenty	   years	   demonstrates	  
(Chwieroth	  2010a;	  Moschella	  2010b).	  With	   the	  onset	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis,	   the	  debate	  on	  how	   to	  
manage	  potentially	  destabilizing	  capital	  inflows	  is	  once	  again	  at	  the	  center	  of	  public	  and	  scholarly	  attention.	  
While	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  crisis,	  emerging	  markets	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  severe	  capital	  outflows	  caused	  by	  
the	  process	  of	  global	  deleveraging,	  in	  the	  final	  quarters	  of	  2009,	  the	  easing	  of	  monetary	  conditions	  in	  the	  
advanced	  economies	  pushed	  capital	  flows	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  Since	  then,	  several	  emerging	  countries,	  
such	   as	   Brazil,	   Chile	   and	   Peru,	   have	   heavily	   intervened	   in	   their	   currency	  markets,	   reviving	  memories	   of	  
currency	  wars	  (Financial	  Times,	  Trade	  war	  looming,	  warns	  Brazil,	  10	  January	  2011).	  In	  short,	  the	  volatility	  of	  
capital	  flows	  from	  2008	  onwards	  raises	  the	  important	  question	  of	  what	  tools	  policy-­‐makers	  can	  use	  to	  stem	  
the	  potential	  inflationary	  pressures	  and	  asset	  bubbles	  associated	  with	  capital	  inflows.	  
During	   the	   1990s,	   the	   most	   prevalent	   stance	   was	   against	   the	   use	   of	   capital	   restrictions	   (Cohen	  
2002;	  Grabel	  2003;	  Williamson	  2003,	  49).iv	  This	  intellectual	  stance	  clearly	  emerges	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
Fund’s	   approach	   to	   the	   issue.	   During	   this	   era,	   the	   IMF	   excluded	   the	   use	   of	   controls	   from	   its	   list	   of	  
appropriate	  capital	  flow	  management	  policies,	  arguing	  that	  controls	  were	  ineffective	  in	  managing	  both	  the	  
macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  stability	  risks	  deriving	  from	  large	  inflows.	  
In	  arguing	  for	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  controls,	  the	  Fund	  held	  that	  they	  could	  generally	  not	  work	  to	  
stem	  exchange	  rate	  appreciation	  and	  asset	  and	  credit	  bubbles,	  because	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  change	  the	  
volume	   and	   composition	   of	   inflows,	   and	  were	   administratively	   difficult	   to	   put	   into	   place.	   The	   Fund	   also	  
rejected	   the	  option	  of	   using	   controls	   to	  mitigate	  macroeconomic	   risks,	   based	  on	  evidence	   indicating	   the	  
inability	  of	  controls	  to	  support	  stabilization	  efforts	  (Schadler,	  et	  al.	  1993).	  Controls	  were	  also	  regarded	  as	  an	  
obstacle	  to	  necessary	  macroeconomic	  adjustmentsv,	  and	  therefore	  as	  potentially	  destabilizing.	  In	  the	  words	  
of	   one	   of	   the	   IMF	   staff	   memorandums	   on	   this	   issue,	   ‘controls	   imposed	   by	   one	   country	   typically	   affect	  
others	   adversely.’	   This	   happened	   because	   controls,	   the	   Fund	   argued,	   delayed	   necessary	   exchange	   rate	  
adjustments,	  or	  limited	  the	  repatriation	  of	  invested	  capital	  or	  financial	  market	  access.vi	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
view	  was	  that	  controls	  had	  negative	  spill-­‐over	  and	  contagion	  effects	  that	  could	  interfere	  with	  the	  efficient	  
allocation	  of	  investment	  across	  countries,	  thereby	  reducing	  gains	  from	  inter-­‐temporal	  (asset)	  trade	  much	  as	  
tariffs	  limit	  the	  gains	  from	  goods	  (within-­‐period)	  trade.	  	  
Emblematic	  of	  this	  orientation	  was	  the	  IMF’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Chilean	  experience	  with	  capital	  
controls.	   Chile,	  which	   had	   introduced	  market-­‐based	   controls	   on	   capital	   inflows	   in	   1991	   and	   1992,	  was	   a	  
country	   experiencing	   sustained	   rates	   of	   economic	   growth	   while	   avoiding	   the	   negative	   macroeconomic	  
effects	  associated	  with	  large	  inflows.vii	  From	  the	  Fund’s	  perspective,	  however,	  capital	  controls	  could	  at	  best	  
be	  regarded	  as	  ‘of	  limited	  macroeconomic	  effectiveness’.viii	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  possibility	  that	  
capital	   controls	   could	   be	   a	   means	   to	   address	   financial	   stability	   risks	   was	   not	   even	   considered.ix	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   capital	   account	   was	   considered	   as	   a	   useful	   mechanism	   through	   which	   to	  
increase	   the	  efficiency	  of	   the	  domestic	   financial	   system,	  by	   introducing	  competition	  and	   innovation	   from	  
abroad	  (Fischer	  1997;	  Guitiàn	  1996).	  
Following	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   this	   whole-­‐hearted	   rejection	   of	   capital	  
controls	  has	  been	  relaxed.	  As	  the	   IMF	  now	  puts	   it,	   ‘there	  may	  be	  circumstances	   in	  which	  capital	  controls	  
are	   a	   legitimate	   component	   of	   the	   policy	   response	   to	   surges	   in	   capital	   inflows’	   (Ostry,	   et	   al.	   2010,	   15).	  
Although	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐crisis	  intellectual	  stances	  may	  at	  first	  seem	  dramatic,	  a	  
closer	   look	   at	   the	   Fund’s	   ideational	   shift	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   reveals	   several	  
elements	  of	  continuity	  with	  pre-­‐crisis	   thinking.	  Rather	   than	  replacing	   its	  previous	  positions,	   the	  Fund	  has	  
incrementally	  adjusted	   it	  by	   incorporating	  new	  evidence	  and	  by	  clarifying	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  
controls	  may	  be	  considered	  acceptable.	  	  
The	   IMF’s	   rethinking	  of	  capital	  controls	  centres	  on	  the	  recognition	  that	  controls	  can	  be	  helpful	   in	  
managing	   the	   risks	   to	   financial	   stability	   associated	   with	   large	   capital	   inflows.	   Specifically,	   the	   empirical	  
evidence	   collected	   since	   the	   burst	   of	   the	   crisis	   shows	   that	   controls	   may	   be	   helpful	   in	   changing	   the	  
composition	   of	   capital	   flows	   in	   favour	   of	   safer	   transactions,	   tilting	   the	   balance	   towards	   less	   vulnerable	  
liability	   structures	   and	   therefore	   reducing	   financial	   fragility	   (Ostry,	   et	   al.	   2010,	   5).	   Furthermore,	   cross-­‐
country	  experience	  during	   the	  crisis	   shows	   that	   ‘the	  use	  of	   capital	   controls	  was	  associated	  with	  avoiding	  
some	  of	   the	  worst	   growth	  outcomes	  associated	  with	   financial	   fragility’	   (Ostry,	   et	   al.	   2010,	  13).	  Based	  on	  
these	   observations,	   the	   Fund	   has	   come	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   ‘inasmuch	   as	   controls	   reduce	   countries’	  
precautionary	   demand	   for	   reserves	   by	   curtailing	   inflows	   of	   “hot	   money”	   and	   especially	   risky	   forms	   of	  
liabilities,	  they	  could	  contribute	  to	  reducing	  global	  imbalances	  and	  thus	  enhance	  systemic	  stability’	  (Ostry,	  
et	  al.	  2010,	  15).	  In	  short,	  controls	  have	  become	  acceptable	  because	  they	  may	  contribute	  to	  mitigating	  the	  
financial	  risks	  associated	  with	  capital	  inflows,	  including	  those	  associated	  with	  their	  volatility	  (IMF	  2011c,	  Ch.	  
4).	  	  
While	  the	  Fund’s	  inclusion	  of	  capital	  controls	  in	  the	  policy	  toolkit	  available	  to	  domestic	  authorities	  
is	   based	   on	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   potential	   positive	   impact	   of	   these	   restrictive	   measures	   on	   financial	  
stability,	  more	  continuity	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  understanding	  of	  capital	  controls	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  manage	  the	  
macroeconomic	   implications	  of	   capital	   inflows.	  As	  was	   the	   case	   in	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	   period,	   controls	   are	   still	  
regarded	   as	   ineffective	   in	   impacting	   the	   overall	   volume	   of	   inflows	   and	   ‘rarely	   successful	   in	   dampening	  
exchange	  rate	  appreciation’	  (IMF	  2010b,	  13).x	  
That	   the	  Fund	  has	  merely	   relaxed	  but	  not	   rejected	   its	  earlier	  orthodoxy	  opposing	  controls	   is	  also	  
evident	  in	  its	  embrace	  of	  a	  sequenced	  approach.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  controls	  are	  accepted	  as	  ‘a	  useful	  element	  
in	  the	  policy	  toolkit’	  only	  if	  temporary,	  and	  if	  ‘the	  available	  policy	  options	  and	  prudential	  measures	  do	  not	  
appear	  to	  be	  sufficient	  or	  cannot	  provide	  a	  timely	  response	  to	  an	  abrupt	  or	  large	  increase	  in	  capital	  inflows’	  
(IMF	  2010b,	  4;	  	  also	  IMF	  2011a).	  The	  IMF	  thus	  accepts	  capital	  controls	  only	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  policy	  tool	  –	  that	  
is,	  their	  use	  is	  recommended	  only	  after	  such	  measures	  as	  building	  up	  reserves,	  letting	  currencies	  appreciate	  
and	  cutting	  budget	  deficits	  have	  been	  implemented.	  	  
As	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  the	  IMF	  still	  holds	  the	  view	  that	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  controls	  by	  individual	  
countries	  has	   the	  potential	   for	  adverse	  multilateral	   consequences.	   In	  particular,	   it	   argues	   that	  an	  unwise	  
use	   of	   controls	   may	   prevent	   macroeconomic	   policy	   adjustment	   in	   emerging	   markets	   with	   undervalued	  
currencies,	   thereby	   hampering	   global	   recovery.	   Furthermore,	   ‘controls	   imposed	   by	   some	   countries	   may	  
lead	  other	  countries	  to	  adopt	  them	  also:	  widespread	  adoption	  of	  controls	  could	  have	  a	  chilling	  longer-­‐term	  
impact	  on	   financial	   integration	  and	  globalization,	  with	  significant	  output	  and	  welfare	   losses’	   (Ostry,	  et	  al.	  
2010,	  5).	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   IMF	   has	   been	   gradually	   edging	  
towards	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  view	  that	  capital	  controls	  may	  help	  countries	  manage	  the	  financial	  stability	  
risks	  deriving	  from	  large	  capital	   inflows.	  As	  the	  former	  Managing	  Director	  Dominique	  Strauss-­‐Khan	  put	   it,	  
‘there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  no	  kind	  of	  control	  is	  always	  the	  best	  kind	  of	  situation’	  (Financial	  Times,	  
IMF	  refuses	  to	  rule	  out	  use	  of	  capital	  controls,	  2	  November	  2009).	  For	  an	  organization	  that	  has	  historically	  
opposed	   capital	   controls,	   even	   trying	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   to	  amend	   its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	   to	  allow	   it	   to	  
promote	  capital	  account	  liberalization,	  the	  current	  position	  is	  puzzling	  and	  deserves	  scholarly	  attention.	  	  
However,	   this	   embrace	   has	   not	   taken	   the	   form	   of	   a	   dramatic	   departure	   from	   previously	   held	  
normative	   and	   cognitive	   orientations.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   current	   ideational	   stance	   within	   the	   Fund	  
presents	  broad	  continuities	  with	  past	  policy	   ideas	  –	  a	  circumstance	  that	  has	   led	  several	  commentators	  to	  
describe	  the	  Fund’s	  embrace	  of	  capital	  controls	  as	  inter	  alia	  hesitant	  (Batista	  2012)	  and	  incoherent	  (Grabel	  
2010).	   In	   what	   follows,	   I	   provide	   an	   explanation	   for	   this	   incremental	   dynamic	   of	   ideational	   change.	  
Specifically,	  I	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  mandate,	  showing	  how	  its	  empowering-­‐constraining	  nature	  
shaped	  the	  dynamic	  of	  ideational	  change	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  within	  the	  Fund	  since	  the	  crisis	  erupted.	  	  	  
	  
3. Explaining	  the	  Fund’s	  incremental	  ideational	  change	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  more	  dramatic	  rethink	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  approach	  to	  capital	  controls	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  consensual	  view	  in	  IPE	  ideational	  research,	  two	  factors	  figure	  prominently:	  the	  absence	  
of	  strategic	  actors	  willing	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  provided	  by	  the	  crisis	  to	  push	  new	  ideas	  to	  
the	  fore,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  alternative	  ideas	  that	  could	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  controls	  from	  an	  economic	  point	  of	  
view	  (see	  also	  Blyth	  2011;	  forthcoming).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  absence	  of	  agency	  and	  alternative	  ideas	  would,	  
from	  this	  perspective,	  have	  prevented	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  typical	  punctuated	  and	  paradigmatic	  model	  of	  
ideational	  change.	  
However,	   the	   empirical	   record	   does	   not	   lend	   support	   to	   the	   argument	   that	   these	   causal	   factors	  
account	  for	  the	  pattern	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  ideational	  change.	  For	  one	  thing,	  as	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  documented	  
the	  supporters	  of	  a	  gradualist	  approach	  to	  capital	  liberalization	  have	  been	  well-­‐represented	  within	  key	  IMF	  
departments,	   such	  as	   the	  Research	  and	   the	  Policy	  Development	  and	  Review	  Departments,	   since	   the	   late	  
1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  (Chwieroth	  2008).	  Gradualists	  have	  long	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  sequencing	  
to	  the	  liberalization	  process	  and	  have	  supported	  the	  use	  of	  temporary	  controls	  in	  some	  circumstances.	  It	  is	  
also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Mexican	  and	  the	  Asian	  crises	  in	  the	  1990s	  strengthened	  
gradualist	  advocacy	  within	  the	  organization	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  radical	  shift	  supporters	  (Chwieroth	  2008	  
150-­‐51,	  153-­‐54).	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   internal	   advocates	   favouring	   the	   use	   of	   capital	   controls	   could	   count	   on	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  well-­‐developed	  intellectual	  apparatus	  to	  justify	  the	  introduction	  of	  restrictive	  measures	  long	  
before	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   burst.	   	   Although	   the	   IMF	   has	   often	   claimed	   not	   to	   have	   abandoned	   its	  
‘neoclassical	   model’	   after	   this	   model’s	   failure	   to	   recognize	   the	   imperfections	   in	   international	   capital	  
markets	   in	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	  Asian	   crisis	   (Stiglitz	   2004),	   the	  organization	   in	   fact	   began	   to	   reassess	   its	  
position	   on	   controls	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   based	   on	   the	   experience	   of	   countries	   that	   had	   imposed	   controls	  
(Grabel	   and	   Chang	   2010).	   The	   ideational	   path	   through	  which	   the	   Fund	   came	   to	   rethink	   capital	   controls	  
unfolded	  in	  three	  stages.	  
Firstly,	  research	  within	  the	  Fund	  called	  into	  question	  the	  presumed	  positive	  and	  direct	  relationship	  
between	  financial	  liberalization	  and	  economic	  growth	  that	  had	  long	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  consensus	  within	  the	  
organization.	   This	   theoretical	   reassessment	   has	   been	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   emerging	  
market	  crises	  of	  the	  1990s.	  For	  instance,	  a	  number	  of	  IMF	  studies	  showed	  that	  large	  capital	  inflows	  are	  not	  
associated	  with	  substantial	  risk-­‐sharing	  (Kose,	  et	  al.	  2007)	  and	  that	  financial	  integration	  has	  not	  significantly	  
helped	   emerging	   and	   developing	   countries	   in	   stabilizing	   their	   consumption	   growth	   (Prasad,	   et	   al.	   2003).	  
Furthermore,	   IMF	   staff	   started	   to	   pay	   greater	   attention	   to	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   the	   benefits	   that	   capital	  
flows	  may	  bring	  about.	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  view	  emerged	  that	   ‘far	  more	   important	  than	  the	  direct	  growth	  
effects	  of	  access	  to	  more	  capital	  is	  how	  capital	  flows	  generate	  a	  number	  of…’potential	  collateral	  benefits’’	  
(Kose,	   et	   al.	   2006,	   8).	   These	   ‘collateral’	   benefits	   include	   a	   strengthened	  domestic	   financial	  market,	   good	  
governance	   and	   market	   discipline.	   These	   factors,	   in	   turn,	   contribute	   to	   GDP	   growth	   (also	   Leiteritz	   and	  
Moschella	  2010).	  	  	  
Secondly,	  well	  before	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  erupted,	  the	  IMF	  had	  already	  started	  detailing	  the	  
policies	   that	   could	  help	  minimize	   the	   costs	   of	   liberalization.	   Strengthening	   the	  domestic	   financial	   system	  
and	   improving	   governance	   figured	  prominently	   in	   this	   list	   of	   necessary	   policies,	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   the	  
experience	   of	   the	   East	   Asian	   crisis	   (Rogoff	   2002).	   In	   short,	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   the	   crisis	   the	   IMF	   had	   already	  
started	   reflecting	   on	   the	   policy	   toolkit	   that	   domestic	   authorities	   could	   adopt	   to	   managing	   the	   risks	   of	  
financial	   integration.	   As	   such,	   particular	   attention	   was	   devoted	   to	   developing	   a	   sequenced	   approach	   to	  
liberalization. xi	  
Finally,	   and	   connected	   to	   the	  aforementioned	   ideational	   twists,	   the	   IMF	  had	  moved	   towards	   the	  
acceptance	  of	   capital	   controls	  as	  a	   legitimate	  part	  of	   the	  policy	   toolkit.	   In	  particular,	  while	   the	  Fund	  had	  
decidedly	   put	   its	   emphasis	   on	   financial	   sector	   policies	   as	   the	   means	   through	   which	   to	   influence	   the	  
direction	  and	  composition	  of	  capital	  inflows,xii	  capital	  controls	  had	  begun	  to	  make	  their	  way	  into	  the	  Fund’s	  
thinking.	  While	  outflow	  controls	  had	  continued	  to	  be	  viewed	  sceptically	  (it	  was	  argued	  that	  their	  use	  could	  
not	  prevent	  devaluation	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  macroeconomic	  misalignments),	  the	  use	  of	  controls	  on	  capital	  
inflows	  had	  become	  an	  increasingly	  acceptable	  policy	  option	  (Eichengreen,	  et	  al.	  1999;	  IMF	  1998,	  79;	  150).	  
Again,	  the	  serial	  crises	  that	  the	  Fund	  confronted	  during	  the	  1990s	  were	  pivotal	  in	  triggering	  a	  reassessment	  
within	   the	   organization	   (Independent	   Evaluation	   Office	   (IEO)	   2005).	   This	   is	   well	   illustrated	   in	   the	   IMF’s	  
revised	  assessment	  of	  Chilean-­‐type	  controls	  –	  that	  is,	  those	  market-­‐based	  controls	  on	  capital	  inflows	  whose	  
use	  had	  been	  stigmatized	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1990s.	  Although	  this	  type	  of	  control	  was	  still	  regarded	  as	  
ineffective	   and	   distortionary	   in	   the	   long	   run	   (IMF	   2007,	   Ch.	   3),	   the	   IMF	   had	   ceased	   to	   regard	   them	   ‘as	  
incompatible	  with	  the	  still-­‐desirable	  goal	  of	  capital	  account	  liberalization.’xiii	  	  
In	   summary,	   before	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   burst,	   there	   existed	   strategic	   and	   well-­‐positioned	  
advocates	   endowed	   with	   alternative	   ideas	   opposing	   capital	   controls;	   these	   could	   have	   led	   to	   a	   more	  
dramatic	   type	  of	   ideational	   change	   than	   the	  one	  we	  are	   currently	  observing.	   The	   incremental	  pattern	  of	  
ideational	  change	  cannot	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  organizational	  practices	  and	  routines	  that	  prevented	  the	  Fund	  
from	  assessing	  developments	   in	  the	  global	   financial	  system.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	  1990s,	  
the	  IMF	  had	  actually	  strengthened	  its	  organizational	  resources	  by	  creating	  new	  departments	  and	  nurturing	  
financial	  expertise,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  financial	  developments	  (Moschella	  2011).	  	  
In	  short,	  when	  the	  uncertainty	  of	   the	  crisis	   led	   to	   the	  questioning	  of	  existing	  ways	  of	   thinking	  on	  
capital	   controls,	   there	   existed	   internal	   advocates	   endowed	   with	   fully-­‐fledged	   ideas	   and	   organizational	  
resources	  that	  could	  have	  pushed	  for	  a	  more	  radical	  understanding	  of	  capital	  restrictions.	  	  
	   However	  this	  did	  not	  happen–	  a	  circumstance	  that	   is	  puzzling	   if	  we	  consider	  the	  rise	  of	  emerging	  
markets’	  economic	  power	  and	  their	  likely	  support	  for	  more	  radical	  pronouncements	  that	  would	  have	  taken	  
the	   stigma	  away	   from	   the	  use	  of	   controls	   (Gallagher	   forthcoming).	   Furthermore,	   the	   support	   for	   a	  more	  
profound	   rethink	   was	   also	   explicitly	   provided	   in	   2011	   by	   the	   G20	   Finance	   Ministers	   and	   Central	   Bank	  
Governors,	   who	   endorsed	   the	   view	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	   “one-­‐size	   fits	   all”	   approach	   or	   rigid	   definition	   of	  
conditions	  for	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  flow	  management	  measures’.xiv	  	  The	  French	  President	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy,	  who	  
held	  the	  Presidency	  of	  the	  G20	  Leaders	  in	  2011,	  even	  concluded	  that	  ‘the	  use	  of	  capital	  controls	  …	  is	  now	  
accepted	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  stabilisation’	  (as	  quoted	  in	  Gallagher	  2011).	  
	   Hence,	  if	  all	  the	  standard	  conditions	  were	  in	  place	  for	  a	  more	  profound	  ideational	  change	  than	  the	  
one	  we	  are	   currently	  observing,	  we	  need	   to	   shift	   attention	   from	   the	   ‘usual’	   factors	   explaining	   ideational	  
change	   to	   those	   factors	   that	   are	   usually	   regarded	   as	   constraining	   it,	   namely	   those	   associated	   with	   the	  
institutional	   set-­‐up	   in	   which	   actors	   operate.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   IMF’s	  mandate	   provided	   its	   staff	   with	   the	  
necessary	   room	   to	   re-­‐interpret	   the	   Fund’s	   role	   on	   capital	   flows	   in	   light	   of	   the	   changed	   economic	  
circumstances	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  crisis.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  rules	  that	  guide	  the	  Fund’s	  behaviour	  were	  
sufficiently	   open	   to	   re-­‐interpretation	   and	   thus	   allowed	   the	   organization	   to	   tackle	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  
changing	  economic	  environment	  (Best	  2012).	  
	   The	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  give	  the	  IMF	  the	  task	  of	  promoting	  economic	  growth	  and	  presiding	  over	  
international	   financial	   stability	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	   its	  quasi-­‐universal	  membership.	  Of	  course,	   this	   is	  a	  very	  
broad	   mandate	   that	   has	   been	   implemented	   in	   different	   ways	   over	   time.	   As	   the	   IMF	   itself	   recognizes,	  
although	   ‘the	   IMF's	  main	   purpose—to	   provide	   the	   global	   public	   good	   of	   financial	   stability—is	   the	   same	  
today	  as	  it	  was	  when	  the	  organization	  was	  established’,	  the	  modalities	  through	  which	  the	  Fund	  achieves	  its	  
established	  objectives	  have	   ‘evolved	  along	  with	   the	  global	  economy	  throughout	   its	  65-­‐year	  history’.xv	  For	  
instance,	  the	  modalities	  through	  which	  the	  IMF	  conducts	  its	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  surveillance,	  or	  those	  
through	  which	   it	  provides	   financial	  assistance	  to	  crisis-­‐hit	  countries,	  have	  been	  significantly	  adapted	  over	  
time	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  original	  objectives.xvi	  
The	   flexibility	   of	   the	   IMF’s	  mandate	   is	   also	   relevant	   in	   the	   case	   under	   examination.	   Immediately	  
after	  the	  release	  of	  the	  staff	  position	  note	  in	  which	  the	  Fund	  went	  public	  with	  its	  new	  stance	  on	  controls	  
(i.e.	   Ostry,	   et	   al.	   2010),	   the	   IMF	   developed	   an	   internal	   report	   clarifying	   the	   links	   between	   the	   emerging	  
ideational	  shift	  and	  the	  Fund’s	  institutional	  mandate	  (IMF	  2010a).	  For	  instance,	  the	  report	  clarifies	  that	  the	  
Fund’s	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  allow	  for	  a	  new	  understanding	  on	  controls	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  capital	  flows	  
on	   the	   core	  mission	   of	   the	   organization.	   As	   the	   Fund	   puts	   it,	   ‘in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   global	   crisis,	   and	  
especially	  now	  with	  resurgent	  capital	  flows	  requiring	  a	  considered	  policy	  response,	  it	  is	  not	  tenable	  for	  the	  
Fund	   to	   remain	   on	   the	   sidelines	   of	   a	   debate	   so	   central	   to	   global	   economic	   stability’	   (IMF	   2010a,	   3).	  
Furthermore,	   the	   Fund’s	   surveillance	   function	   (which	   entails	   giving	   advice	   on	   policies	   directed	   towards	  
international	   capital	   flows)	   and	   the	   Fund’s	   crisis	   assistance	   role,	   (which	   may	   lead	   the	   Fund	   to	   provide	  
financing	   to	   address	   capital	   account	   crises)	   figure	   among	   the	   institutional	   considerations	   that	   justify	   the	  
adjustment	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  thinking	  on	  controls	  (IMF	  2010a,	  24-­‐5).	  
While	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  institutional	  mandate	  provided	  the	  necessary	  flexibility	  to	  rethink	  the	  use	  of	  
controls,	   it	   also	   limits	   the	   ideas	   of	   IMF	   staff.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   IMF	   is	   expected	   to	   justify	   the	   use	   of	   capital	  
restrictions	   against	   the	  mandate	   set	   forth	   in	   Article	   IV	   according	   to	  which	   ‘the	   essential	   purpose	   of	   the	  
international	  monetary	  system	  [over	  which	  the	  IMF	  presides]	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  that	  facilitates	  the	  
exchange	   of	   goods,	   service,	   and	   capital	   among	   countries’.	   Hence,	   IMF	   staff	  members	  were	   called	   on	   to	  
think	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  capital	  controls	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  compatible	  with	  this	  provision	  and	  the	  related	  
one,	  ensuring	  that	  members	  retained	  the	  freedom	  to	   impose	  controls	  (Article	  VI,	  Section	  3).	   In	  short,	  the	  
mandate,	  although	  flexible,	  set	  parameters	  on	  what	   ideas	   IMF	  staff	  could	  put	  forward.	   In	  particular,	  staff	  
members	  have	  to	  balance	  different	   institutional	  exigencies:	  ensuring	  the	   free	  exchange	  of	  capital,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  and	  preserving	  the	  freedom	  to	  impose	  controls,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Fund	  is	  also	  
expected	  to	  foster	  a	  multilateral,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  approach	  in	  line	  with	  its	  mandate. xvii	  
This	  specific	  institutional	  configuration	  has	  led	  to	  a	  qualified	  approach	  to	  capital	  controls,	  that	  is,	  an	  
approach	  that	  tries	  to	  combine	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  flows	  with	  the	  new	  economic	  
needs	   of	   its	   members	   in	   their	   struggle	   to	   manage	   capital	   volatility.	   The	   Fund	   has	   thus	   developed	   a	  
framework	   that	   identifies	   the	   spectrum	  of	  measures	   available	   to	   policymakers	   in	  managing	   inflows	   (IMF	  
2011a).	   Although	   the	   framework	   includes	   capital	   controls,	   they	   are	   still	   sceptically	   regarded	   from	   a	  
multilateral	   perspective	   and	   their	   use	   is	   therefore	   suggested	   only	   when	   macroeconomic	   considerations	  
preclude	   the	   use	   of	   traditional	  monetary	   and	   fiscal	   policy	   tools	   (such	   as	  when	   the	   exchange	   rate	   is	   not	  
undervalued	  and	  the	  inflation	  outlook	  is	  not	  benign)	  (IMF	  2011a,	  7).	  The	  Fund	  itself	  provides	  a	  justification	  
for	   this	   sceptical	   view	  on	   controls	  by	   stating	   that	   ‘the	   key	  motivation	   for	   the	   Fund	   to	  have	  a	  preference	  
against	   such	  measures	   is	   institutional.’	   	   That	   is,	   ‘since	   such	  measures	   directly	   discriminate	   against	   non-­‐
residents,	  they	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  international	  cooperative	  spirit	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  Fund,	  particularly	  
given	  the	  Fund’s	  role	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  international	  monetary	  system’	  (IMF	  2011b,	  2).	  	  
In	   summary,	   the	   Fund’s	   embrace	   of	   capital	   controls	   has	   become	   possible	   with	   the	   flexibility	  
provided	  by	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement;	  this	  flexibility	  allows	  IMF	  staff	  members	  to	  re-­‐interpret	  the	  role	  of	  
the	   Fund	   in	   light	   of	   changed	   economic	   circumstances.	   However,	   this	   institutional	   factor	   was	   not	   solely	  
permissive—it	   also	  had	  a	   constraining	  effect	  on	   the	   type	  of	   ideational	   change	   that	   the	   IMF	   could	  adopt.	  
Given	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  opposing	  exigencies	  and	  to	  ensure	  an	  even-­‐handed	  approach	  to	  its	  membership,	  
the	   Fund	   has	   shown	   a	   cautious	   embrace	   of	   controls	   and	   has	   tried	   to	   combine	   the	   earlier	   orthodoxy	   of	  




Ideational	   scholars	   in	  political	   economy	   largely	   share	   an	  understanding	  of	   ideational	   change	  as	   a	  
punctuated	  process.	  However,	   the	   findings	  of	   this	  paper	   reveal	   that	  other	   change	  dynamics	   in	   fact	  exist.	  
Ideational	  change	  may	  well	  occur	   incrementally	   in	  ordinary	  times	  (Carstensen	  2011).	  Alternatively,	  as	  the	  
present	  study	  has	  demonstrated,	  the	  incremental	  dynamic	  of	  ideational	  change	  can	  also	  materialize	  after	  a	  
major	  shock,	  such	  as	  a	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  
By	  shedding	  light	  on	  this	  understudied	  variant	  of	  ideational	  change,	  the	  paper	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  
the	  punctuated	  model	  is	  wrong	  or	  irrelevant.	  But	  the	  paper	  indicates	  that	  there	  are	  circumstances	  in	  which	  
the	  expectations	  of	  the	  model	  may	  not	  be	  fulfilled.	  The	  ideational	  research	  agenda	  thus	  needs	  expanding	  in	  
order	  to	  identify	  the	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  one	  specific	  change	  dynamic	  instead	  of	  another.	  In	  the	  case	  under	  
investigation,	   the	   factors	   that	   help	   account	   for	   the	   Fund’s	   incremental	   embrace	  of	   capital	   controls	   since	  
2007	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  enabling	  features	  of	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  IMF	  staff	  members	  
operate.	   In	   contrast	   to	   cases	  where	   institutions	   prevent	   change	   until	   the	   point	  where	   the	   pressures	   for	  
change	   become	   irresistible,	   leading	   to	   an	   explosion,	   here	   institutions	   acted	   as	   the	   safety	   valves	   that	  
allowed	   for	   some	   kind	   of	   pressure	   relief	   and	   thereby	   prevented	   the	   blast.	   Specifically,	   the	   Fund’s	  
institutional	   mandate	   provided	   IMF	   staff	   with	   the	   opportunity	   to	   reinterpret	   the	   Fund’s	   approach	   to	  
controls.	  As	  a	  result,	  rather	  than	  disrupting	  the	  existing	  equilibrium,	  ideational	  change	  took	  place	  within	  it.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  change	  was	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  institutional	  mandate,	  giving	  rise	  
to	  a	  type	  of	  ideational	  change	  that	  presents	  broad	  continuities	  with	  past	  policy	  ideas.	  
By	   emphasizing	   the	   role	   played	   by	   institutions	   in	   explaining	   the	   specific	   dynamics	   of	   ideational	  
change,	  this	  study	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  agents	  and	  the	  strategic	  action	  in	  which	  they	  
engage	   in	   line	  with	   recent	   institutionalist	   scholarship	   (Bell	  2011).	   It	   is	  one	   thing	   to	  claim	  that	   institutions	  
provide	  actors	  with	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	   in	  bringing	  about	   ideational	  change—it	   is	  quite	  another	  to	  claim	  
that	  this	  ideational	  change	  will	  always	  take	  place.	  It	   is	  not	  difficult	  to	  think	  of	  cases	  where,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
room	  to	  manoeuvre,	   change	  does	  not	  materialize.	  For	   instance,	   IMF	  staff	  had	   the	  opportunity	   to	  change	  
their	  policy	  ideas	  on	  capital	  account	  liberalization	  after	  the	  1994	  Mexican	  financial	  crisis	  but	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  
(Moschella	  2010a).	  As	  a	   result,	  while	   the	   institutional	   flexibility	   identified	  above	   is	   certainly	   important	   in	  
explaining	   the	   absence	   of	   punctuated	   change,	   it	   alone	   cannot	   explain	   the	   initial	   push	   towards	   change.	  
Central	   to	   the	   process	   of	   ideational	   transformation	   is	   the	   ability	   of	   agents	   to	   exploit	   the	   political	   space	  
available	  to	  them	  in	  order	  to	  propose	  new	  ideas	  or	  to	  consider	  new	  versions	  of	  existing	  ones.	  
In	   short,	   if	  we	  want	   to	  expand	   the	   research	  agenda	   in	   ideational	   scholarship	  by	   investigating	   the	  
causes	   of	   different	   dynamics	   of	   ideational	   change,	   the	   interaction	   between	   agents	   and	   institutional	  
constraints	   is	   crucial.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   constructivist	   political	   science	   scholarship	   can	   be	   effectively	  
complemented	   with	   historical	   institutionalism	   in	   analyses	   of	   financial	   crisis	   and	   reform	   (c.f.	   Baker	   and	  
Underhill	   2012;	  Moschella	   and	   Tsingou	  2013).	   Finally,	   an	   important	   priority	   of	   future	   research	  will	   be	   to	  
understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  different	  types	  of	   ideational	  change.	   In	  particular,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  
specify	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  small	  changes	  snowball	  into	  more	  radical	  ideational	  innovations.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  relevant	  for	  the	  case	  under	  investigation	  here.	  Indeed,	  although	  the	  current	  Fund’s	  rethink	  on	  
controls	   is	   timid	   in	   light	   of	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   collected	   as	   the	   result	   of	   the	   latest	   crisis,	   it	   certainly	  
signals	  that	  the	  IMF	  is	  revaluating	  its	  assumptions	  about	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  liberalization.	  This	  leads	  
the	  Fund	  into	  potentially	  uncharted	  territories.	  We	  still	  lack	  the	  analytical	  toolkit	  to	  understand	  if	  and	  when	  
this	  apparently	  hesitant	  revaluation	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  paradigm	  shift.	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